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A Political Scientist as Constitutional Lawyer:
A Reply to Louis Fisher
RAOUL BERGER*
"a little learning is a dangerous thing . .
-Alexander Pope
Noting that "Current writings by political scientists depend heavily on
Professor Raoul Berger," Louis Fisher sets out in Raoul Berger on Public
Law,' an omnibus review of the four books I have published since 1969,2 to
prove that they lack "solid scholarship," and "urge[s] political scientists to
proceed with caution before adopting Berger as an authoritative and
reliable source. 3 Presumably he assumes that social scientists like Alpheus
Thomas Mason, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and C. Vann Woodward, and
constitutional scholars like Alexander Bickel, Willard Hurst, and Philip
Kurland, with whom one or another of these books found favor,4 were ill-
equipped to assay "solid scholarship." Fisher, who charges me with being
"one-sided," with "unidimensional lawyer briefs,"5 who is so quick to stress
that Berger does not "mention" this or the other fact,6 makes "no mention"
of such respected reviewers, or of any views opposed to his own, but relies
on lesser fry whose merit is obvious-they criticized my writings. This is
* J.D., Northwestern Univ. 1935; L.L.M., Harvard 1938; Charles Warren Senior Fellow in
American Legal History, Emeritus, Harvard University.
1. 8 POL. ScI. REVIEWER 173 (1978) [hereinafter Fisher].
2. CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969) [hereinafter CONGRESS V. COURT]; IMPEACHMENT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973) [hereinafter IMPEACHMENT]; EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE]; GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].
3. Fisher, supra note 1, at 174.
4. Their encomia appear on the dust jackets of my books.
5. Fisher, supra note 1, at 178, 198.
6. Eg., "This is basic history but I find no mention of it anywhere in Berger's four
books . . . . Do we ignore information that becomes inconvenient and upsetting to tidy accounts?"
Id. at 176-77; and see id. at 178, 180. But see note 175 infra.
7. Although Fisher cites profusely to my replies, it is to select "polemical" phrases, never to
examine any of my refutations on the merits. Several reviewers have commented that my critics "have
given singularly unsatisfactory answers" to some of my questions. Kommers, Book Review, 40 REVIEW
OF POLITICS 409, 413 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 694 (1978): "Regrettably
fewer constitutional scholars and theorists than one might think seem prepared to acknowledge the
serious challenge Berger's argument poses." And Perry adds, "Berger effectively destroys whatever
might have remained of the notion that modern constitutional cases involving legislative
reapportionment, school desegregation, criminal procedure, or first amendment issues are somehow
rooted (however tenuously) in the original understanding .. .of the fourteenth amendment." Id. at
694, 688. Professor John Burleigh, who disagrees with my view of the Court's role, stated that my book
"not only raises all the right questions, but is carefully documented and rigorously argued, at once
learned, illuminating and challenging." Burleigh, The Supreme Court vs. the Constitution, 50 THE
PUB. INTEREST 151, 152-53 (Winter 1978).
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but one illustration of Fisher's unfailing unwillingness to take account of
discrepant facts and opposing opinions, a prime requisite of scholarship,
the absence of which casts doubt on his qualifications to pass judgment on
the scholarship of others. So packed with error is Fisher's tirade that but
for the fact, to quote him, that for political scientists "[t]he temptation is
strong to take at second-hand what they are unprepared and unwilling to
study directly,"8 I should consider it unworthy of further remark,
particularly because it is more laborious to remove than to smear graffiti.
I. THE EXECUTIVE POWER
As a prelude to his assault upon my study of executive privilege,
Fisher seeks to rehabilitate an uncircumscribed Executive Power,
endowed with undescribed "implied, inherent" powers, not limited by the
accompanying enumeration of granted powers. To begin with his
discussion of the 1793 exchange between Hamilton and Madison
respecting the Executive Power in the "Pacificus" and "Helvidius" papers,
he opines that my treatment
is one-sided and idiosyncratic. [Berger] relies on Madison's writings as
"Helvidius," which conform to Berger's scenario, while discounting
Hamilton's essays as "Pacificus," which do not. He tries to discredit the
"Pacificus" essays by quoting John Quincy Adams' remark in 1836 that
Madison "scrutinized the doctrines of Pacificus with an acuteness of intellect
never perhaps surpassed." A convenient quote, no doubt, but it is thin
analysis to dismiss Hamilton by quoting someone else.9
This is a blatant misrepresentation. In fact, I had first demonstrated that
Hamilton had executed a volteface, repudiating assurances he had made
in The Federalist to procure adoption of the Constitution. 0 Adoption was
touch and go and Hamilton, aware of the "aversion of the people to
monarchy," and their readiness to regard "the intended President ...as
the full grown progeny of that detested parent," had soothingly down-
graded one after another of the enumerated Executive Powers. For
example, the "Commander-in-Chief was merely to be the 'first General' ";
he assured the Ratifiers that nothing was "to be feared" from an Executive
"with the confined authorities of a President."' 1 Now as "Pacificus" he
turned his back on the representations upon which the Ratifiers had relied,
as Madison pointed out in "Helvetius," and plumped for a plenary
executive power, brushing aside the enumeration of specific presidential
powers as not "derogating from the more comprehensive grant of the
8. Fisher, supra note 1, at 173.
9. Id. at 178 (footnotes omitted).
10. ExECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 135.Throughoutl shall cite to my books forcitations
to the sources to show that those materials were spread before Fisher, to direct attention to
confirmatory materials, and to conserve space.
11. Id. at 53.
[Vol. 41:147
REPLY TO LOUIS FISHER
Executive power."'12 So I did not "dismiss Hamilton [merely] by quoting
from someone else."
Is Adams' testimony of less weight than Louis Fisher's views? Adams'
evaluation, it may be added, was later shared by Edward Corwin, who
remarked on the "essential truth of 'Helvidius' contention that 'Pacificus'
reading of the executive power clause contravened, certainly in effect, the
express intention of the Constitution that the war-declaring pow-
er . . . should lodge with the legislative authority," 3 as Hamilton himself
had said in the Convention. 14 "When pushed by one critic of the Helvidius-
Pacificus issue," Fisher asserts, "Bergerflips to another position (quoting
again from some one): 'As Professor Henry Steele Commager put it, "it is
Madison, not Hamilton, who has ajust claim to be considered not only the
Father of the Constitution but its most authoritative interpreter." .' 15 The
truth of this statement is hardly controvertible, and not more so because it
is uttered by Commager. To cite it is not to "flip to another position" but to
justify my reliance on Madison's analysis, which represents the views of the
Framers.' 6 Of such demonstrations, rooted in the historical facts, Fisher
asserts that Berger "surrounds himself with oracles instead of
demonstrating to the reader (his jury) the cogency of his arguments"!17
Why too are Fisher's citations to my critics or those who differ with me to
be taken as gospel whereas mine to Adams, Corwin, and Commager, in
confirmation of a recital of historical facts, are ridiculed as "supposed
authorities," "so-called authority"?'"
Consider next Fisher's charge that my "handling of Hamilton is
opportunistic" because I also state that he was "said to reflect the
consensus of the Framers," resorting to "flattery" because "Hamilton is
going to be of use to Berger."' 9 Corwin's statement that Hamilton reflected
the consensus, as Jefferson also stated,2° is dismissed because Corwin cited
to Federalist No. 78, which discusses judicial review (as if that refutes a
consensus in that important frame), and because no one would "ever
seriously present him [Hamilton] as the archetype of the Framers.",21 The
12. Id. at 135-36.
13. Id. at 136.
14. Hamilton stated in the Convention that the "Executive ought to have but little power," and
proposed that the Senate should "have the sole power of declaring war." Id. at 67 n.39.
15. Fisher, supra note 1, at 179 (emphasis added).
16. On the war power see, for example, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 64-69.
17. Fisher, supra note 1, at 203.
18. Id. at 202, 201.
19. Id. at 178. On the other hand it is not "flattery" when Fisher writes of one of my critics,"this
issue is explored with greater care" than by Berger, id. at 185 n.24, or when he contrasts the
"sophisticated treatment" by other commentators with mine, id. at 196 n.48. Another commentator"is
more objective and coherent," id. at 197. For discussion of the latter, see note 120 infra.
20. Jefferson regarded The Federalist as "evidence of the general opinion of those who framed"
the Constitution. C. RossITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 227 (1964).
21. Fisher, supra note 1, at 179.
1980]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 41:147
"archetype" is one of Fisher's own "overstatements"; 22 he overlooks, as
Jefferson pointed out, that in The Federalist Hamilton was attempting to
set forth the views of the Framers, even when he did not share them. 23
Moreover, the consensus reference is fortified by my demonstration that
Hamilton had represented to the Ratifiers that only limited power was
granted to the Executive, a representation that faithfully reflects the views
of the Framers.24
From Fisher's espousal of "Pacificus" one may infer that he too
regards the "Executive Power" as generic, that the subsequent enumera-
tion of specific powers does not derogate "from the more comprehensive
grant in the general clause., 25 In lordly fashion he dismisses Randolph's
assurance that "the powers of Government are enumerated. Is it not, then,
fairly deducible, that it has no power but what is expressly given to it?-for
if its powers were to be general, an enumeration would be needless. 26 This
was an article of faith with the Founders, as is evidenced by similar
remarks of Lee of Virginia and Madison in The Federalist No. 41.27
Madison had stated at the outset that it was essential "to fix the extent of
the Executive authority"; "certain powers . . . must be given"; the
Executive powers "shd. be confined and defined." Later he stated in
22. It is a mark of Fisher's callowness that he calls my attention to William Strunk's caution to
neophyte writers against "overstatement" in his primer Elements of Style. Id. at 201.
23. Letter from Jefferson to Madison, November 8, 1788, 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 53
(Ford ed. 1895): "In some parts it is discoverable that the author means only to say what may be best
said in defense of opinions in which he did not concur." At the close of the Convention Hamilton urged
the delegates to sign the proposed Constitution, notwithstanding that "No man's ideas were more
remote from the plan than his own were known to be. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 645-46 (1911).
24. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 52-53. In the Convention, Madison noted: "Limited
as the powers of the Executive are. "2 M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 109.
25. Id. at 136.
26. Fisher, supra note 1, at 175. Fisher states that Berger "takes comfort in the statement of H.
Lee at the Virginia ratification convention: 'When a question arises with respect to the legality of any
power, exercised or assumed,' the question will be 'Is it enumerated in the Constitution? . . . It is
otherwise arbitrary or unconstitutional.' "
27. For Lee, see note 26 supra. Madison stated: "For what purpose could the enumeration of
particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the precedinggeneral
power?" Such an "absurdity" could not be attributed to the Framers. THE FEDERALISTNo. 41 at269 (J.
Madison) (Luce ed. 1976). Fisher does not explain why Randolph-Lee-Madison are entitled to no
weight. Instead he argues that "[t]he methods used by Berger are poorly grounded" because the First
Congress rejected the proposal to make the tenth amendment read powers "not expressly delegated."
Fisher, supra note I, at 176 (emphasis added). But as his citation to Madison shows, this was because
"every minutiae" could not be expressed. The rejection of "expressly" was not meant to expand the
enumerated powers but to leave room for implied powers needed for execution of the express powers.
See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra. After the rejection of "expressly," Madison reiterated in
1792, "those who proposed . . . [and "ratified"] the Constitution conceived-that this is not an
indefinite Government, deriving its powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers, but
a limited Government, tied down to the specified powers which explain and define the general terms." 3
M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 366.
Fisher's theory held no charms for Justice Story. Writing in 1832, he stated: "The Constitution
declares that the powers of Congress shall extend to certain enumerated cases. This specification of
particulars evidently excludes all pretensions to a general legislative authority. Why? Because an
affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority were
intended." I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 448 (5th ed.
1905).
1980] REPLY TO LOUIS FISHER
Federalist No. 45 that the "powers delegated . . to the federal
government are few and defined." 28 "Enumeration," therefore, was not
merely a canon of construction; emphasis thereon was meant to reassure
Ratifiers jealous of an overblown federal government.29 To be sure, the
Pacificus-Fisher view was adopted by Chief Justice Taft in United States v.
Myers over the vigorous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis.30 Not Taft but
Holmes and Brandeis won the later approval of Justices Black, Douglas,
Frankfurter, and Jackson.3 Jackson flatly repudiated "the view that this
[executive] clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable power but regard[ed]
it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter
stated. 32
To the confirmatory statements of Chief Justice Marshall and Justice
Samuel Miller that "the powers of the government are limited," Fisher
retorts that "such exhortations" do not tell us "where limits are to be
drawn."" To begin with, the "enumerated" powers themselves constitute
"limits." So, the commander-in-chief power, as the legislative history
shows, was not designed to authorize presidential warmaking as
distinguished from conduct of the war once declared by Congress.
4
Instead of meeting my historical demonstration, Fisher loses himself in a
fog of "implied" powers;35 Berger "reject[s] the notion of implied power,
inherent powers . . . or any other extraconstitutional power that is not
expressly vested in one of the branches. 36 Implied powers and inherent
powers are not the same, nor can "extraconstitutional" power be
28. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 58.
29. CONGRESS V. COURT, supra note 2, at 8-16.
30. 272 U.S. 52 (1926); EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 55-59. In IMPEACHMENT I noted
with respect to the trial of Andrew Johnson that the President's power to remove a member of his
cabinet was "settled in our time by Myers v. United States [272 U.S. 52 (1926)]." Fisher finds my
"depend[ence] on a court ruling" ironic. Fisher, supra note 1, at 191. Were I to stop and examine the
underpinning of each and every court ruling in the course of a particular study, I would be launched on
an endless task.
31. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 59 n.59.
32. Id. at 59.
33. Fisher, supra note 1, at 176.
34. It is a half-truth to say "From pre-1787 developments Berger finds evidence that the
commander-in-chief clause should be construed narrowly," id. at 177, for the bulk of my proof drew on
the records of the Convention and explanations by the Founders. See EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra
note 2, at 61-69. Professor Louis Henkin concluded, "There is little evidence that the Framers intended
more than to establish in the President civilian command of the forces for wars declared by
Congress .. " L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50 (1972). See also Lofgren,
War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972).
Broad war-making power of the commander-in-chief is not demonstrated by delegations from
the Continental Congress to General Washington to meet "emergencies" when "all particulars cannot
be foreseen," so that he may meet them as they"may arise upon the place." Fisher, supra note 1, at 178.
In short, the conduct of war in the field necessarily must be left to the"first General." Fisher's failure to
appreciate the significance of such facts vitiates many of his judgments.
35. Again and again, Fisher upbraids me for not "analys[ing] the issue ofimplied powers," id. at
178; he has it that I would "eliminate implied powers for the Executive," id. at 180; and he looked "in
vain for a reasoned position on implied powers," id. at 179.
36. Id. at 175-76 (emphasis added).
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"implied." The test of an implied power, the Supreme Court held, is
whether it is "necessary and proper to carry into effect" an express power.1
7
Although Fisher refers to McCulloch v. Maryland,38 he overlooks that
Marshall restricted it to the "choice of means" to execute a granted
power.39 An inherent power, on the other hand, is "enjoyed by the
possessor of natural right, without being received from another;" in other
words, it is not granted by the Constitution.40 The doctrine of "inherent"
powers would set the enumeration of powers of limited government at
naught. Justice Jackson, adverting to the express presidential authoriza-
tion to "require the Opinion in writing" of each Department head, which
"would seem to be inherent in the Executive if anything is," rebuffed the
claim to a "grant of all conceivable power.",4 1 Madison's insistence on
defining and confining the executive power is incompatible with a claim to
inherent powers. To this demonstration, culminating in my remark that
"[i]t is incongruous to attribute to a generation so in dread of executive
tyranny an intention to give a newly created executive a blank check,"
Fisher retorts that this is "another straw man (who contends that the
Framers wanted to give the President a 'blank check'?). 42 Apparently he is
unaware that his espousal of Pacificus' views, of "extraconstitutional"
power, lays claim to just such "a grant in bulk of all conceivable power"
and of ungranted power to boot.
A further mark of confusion is Fisher's failure to distinguish between
a "pre-1787 attribute of executive power" and "inherent power.' ' 3 The
latter is "extraconstitutional," whereas an "attribute" is a property of a
granted power. For example, the Constitution makes no provision for the
right to challenge jurors, so anxious Ratifiers were assured that the words
"trial by jury" embraced all of its attributes at common law.4 So, too, as
37. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936); EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 180.
38. Fisher, supra note 1, at 177.
39. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 375-76; Marshall repudiated "the most distant
allusion to any extension by construction of the powers of Congress." Id. at 377. In the Convention
Rufus King said, given a provision "for the end. Their discretionary power to provide for the means is
involved according to an established axiom." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 70.
40. BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 2646 (8th ed. 1914). The claim to "inherent" power collides with
the fact that the Founders, in the words of James Iredell, considered that "unlimited power . . . was
not to be trusted, without the most imminent danger, to any man or body of men on earth." I G.
MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857-58).
41. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 59; see also the quote from Madison at note 133 infra.
Oliver Ellsworth commented in the Convention: "The Executive will be regarded by the people with a
jealous eye. Every power for augmenting unnecessarily his influence will be disliked." 2 M. FARRAND,
supra note 23, at 81.
42. Fisher, supra note 1, at 199-200; but see text accompanying notes 210-14 infra.
43. "What is meant by a pre-1787 attribute of executive power? For someone who inveighs
against the doctrine of inherent power, this is a curious approach." Fisher, supra note 1, at 186.
44. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 403. Another example of incomprehension is
Fisher's comment on my remark, drawn from Justice Holmes, that "[s]tatements . . . are themselves
facts, not merely 'evidence" to substantiate'a theory of what the author believed.' "Fisher, supra note 1,
at 201. In Holmes' words, a "party's conduct" may "consist in uttering certain words." 0. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 132 (1923). This was directed to Scott Bice's argument that to test the statements of the
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will appear, the legislative power to investigate into executive conduct was
an attribute of Parliament, on which our Congress was modelled, whereas
the Executive claimed no power to resist.
II. ENGLISH PRE-1787 PRACTICE
It can hardly be disputed that from the beginning the Court has
looked to English practice for the meaning of common law terms
employed in the Constitution and for the scope of the legislative and
executive powers created thereby. 45 Fisher himself has done so.4' But he is
bemused by the role of pre-1787 English history in constitutional
construction. First he concludes that English history "is a poor guide to
understanding executive-legislative relationships in America." As
evidence he instances a departure from the Crown's power to appoint
officers and create offices, in favor of Senate participation, noting
Madison's warning against an "overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of
an hereditary magistrate. 47 He fails to grasp that the departure curtailed
executive power and enlarged the legislative power, unwittingly lending
support to my thesis that Congress was empowered to investigate the
Executive branch. The history has been well-summarized by Professor
Louis Henkin:
[U]nhappy memories of royal prerogative, fear of tyranny, and distrust of any
one man, kept the Framers from giving the President too much
head . . . . In the end and over-all, Congress clearly came first . . . ; the
Executive came second, principally as executive-agent of Congressional
policy. Every grant to the President, including those relating to foreign
affairs, was in effect a derogation from Congressional power, eked out slowly,
reluctantly, and not without limitations and safeguards.
8
When Fisher asserts that "[q]uestions of executive privilege, ... con-
gressional investigation, and the war power cannot be resolved by
framers, we must inquire into what they really believed as distinguished from what they said." Berger,
Judicial Review: Countercriticism in Tranquillity, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 390, 393 (1974). My point was
that a leader's representation to the Senate that, for example, suffrage is excluded from the bill pre-
cludes inquiry into what he secretly believed. Fisher is wildly off course when he deduces from this my
belief "that a point is nailed down by bringing in a statement from a so-called [2] authority." Fisher,
supra note 1, at 201. As a final fillip Fisher has the gall to say "the authors' credentials are often ig-
nored," id., this from one who dismisses citations to J.Q. Adams, H.S. Commager, et al.!
45. For numerous citations, see Berger, Bills of Attainder, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 360-65
(1979).
46. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
47. Fisher, supra note 1, at 184.
48. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note2, at50. This isanother Fisher exhibit for my weakness for
"associating" myself "with men of eminence," and is brushed aside because "Berger and Henkin are
worlds apart in their approach to the Presidency and constitutional law." Fisher, supra note I, at 202.
Be that assumed, it strengthens rather than impeaches a statement in which we concur. In truth, our
parallel studies were published at about the same time, late in 1972, and we were in basic agreement as
to the historical sources and nature of the "commander-in-chief" power, of the presidential foreign
relations power, executive agreements, etc. See Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign
Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972); Berger, War Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29
(1972).
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recounting British practices, 4 9 he overlooks that the Framers' curtail-
ment of crown prerogatives" and allocation of this and the other Crown
power to Congress is incompatible with the argument that Congress'
power of investigation was less than Parliament's sweeping power to in-
quire. To invoke a rejection of British practice in 1921 for light on the role
played by the pre-1787 "British model" is a higgledy-piggledy approach
to constitutional interpretation. 1 What counts is the British practiceprior
to adoption of the Constitution.
Fisher himself observes that Chief Justice Taft "accepted English
practice as authoritative in construing the pardon power," and quotes
from an 1833 case, United States v. Wilson:
5 2
As this [pardon] power had been exercised from time immemorial by the
executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose
judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles
respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for
the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who
would avail himself of it.53
But Fisher regards the "pardon power" as "the one area in which it is
appropriate to turn to British precedents for guidance," the reason being
that "the power granted to the President was in general language, the
phraseology familiar to the common law of England, and no attempt was
made at the Philadelphia Convention to define or limit it."' 54 The same may
be said of high crimes and misdemeanors, habeas corpus, ex post facto,
bills of attainder, trial by jury. It was because they were familiar that there
was no felt need to "define" them, except as in the case of "treason," which
the Framers considered too broad.55 Is the "legislative power" really less
"general" than "pardon"? Allusions in the several Conventions to the
function of the House as the Grand Inquest of the Nation 6 supply some
definition, altogether lacking in the case of pardon. Fisher's partiality to
"pardon" may be explained by the fact that he studied the pardon power
and I did not, apparently a sinful omission.
57
He allows that "[t]he Framers did think in common law terms, but for
institutions and individual liberties they adopted structures and values so
unique that it is misleading to place such heavy stress on British history."5"
In sharp contrast Professor Harry W. Jones stated, "even with respect to
49. Fisher, supra note 1, at 184. It is misleading to suggest that I look to British practice to define
the scope of the "war power." See note 34 supra.
50. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 49-52.
51. Fisher, supra note 1, at 185.
52. 32 U.S. 150 (1833).
53. Fisher, supra note 1, at 187-88 (emphasis added), quoting 32 U.S. at 160.
54. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
55. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3.
56. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 35-36.
57. Fisher, supra note 1, at 187.
58. Id. at 183.
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the distinctive American practice of judicial review, the common law
tradition had the last word . . . Being common lawyers to the core,
early Justices simply took it for granted . . . that the distinctive method
of the common law . . . was to be used in carrying out the challenging
new assignment. 59 So completely did the Framers assume that the terms
they employed would be given their common-law meaning that they felt
constrained to define treason narrowly in order to restrict its excessive
common-law scope.60 Even so, Chief Justice Marshall, like Justice Iredell
before him, considering the meaning of "levying war," held that treason "is
a technical term . . . . It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not
employed by the framers of our constitution in the sense which had been
affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it. '61 In the very case Fisher
cites, Chief Justice Taft declared, "The language of the Constitution
cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to
British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and
adopted. 62 Two such institutions were the legislature and the executive,
from which the Framers made a "unique" departure in cutting down the
royal prerogative and allocating some of its powers to Congress. By
Fisher's own testimony, we are therefore justified in looking to pre-1787
English practice in construing the relation of the executive and legislative
branches.
Although Fisher turns to English history for the content of the
"pardon" power, he does not really understand the uses of history. Thus he
states, "For his books on Impeachment and Executive Privilege, Berger
races back centuries in English history to place his story in proper
perspective. In sharp contrast, Government by Judiciary freezes history by
taking a snapshot of the antislavery movement as it stood at the time of the
39th Congress. 63 Impeachment, Hamilton tells us, was "borrowed" from
England and patterned on its practice-prosecution by the Commons and
judgment by the Lords." Where but to England could one look for the
meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," also borrowed from English
impeachments? Similarly, the terms employed in the fourteenth amend-
ment can only be understood in light of the meaning the framers attached
to them, as is copiously documented in the records of the 39th Congress.
61
59. Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes andAmerican Variations, in
POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 91, 133-34 (H.W. Jones ed. 1976). Enumerating the
powers enjoyed by the Crown but not by the President, Pierce Butler yet observed: "We, in many
instances took the Constitution of Britain, when in its purity, for a model ... "3 M. FARRAND, supra
note 23, at 102. See also id. at 301. And Luther Martin complained: "[W]e were eternally troubled with
arguments and precedents from the British government .... " Id. at 203.
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see also Fisher, supra note 1, at 185.
61. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 5, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693); Fries Case, 9 F. Cas.
826, 911-12 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126).
62. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) (emphasis added).
63. Fisher, supra note 1, at 194.
64. TIlE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 425 (A. Hamilton) (Luce ed. 1976).
65. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 20-36, 166-200.
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Whether it be "high crimes and misdemeanors" or "due process," once that
meaning is found it is equally frozen,6 6 unless Fisher would have it, like
Congressman Gerald Ford, that an "impeachable offense" is whatever the
House, with the concurrence of the Senate "considers [it] to be.' 67
Apparently that is exactly what Fisher does mean, for he states that
"[w]hatever lessons British history contained for America on the
impeachment issue were quickly extinguished by [American] political
developments. 68 Over the years, however, the Court has regarded the
common law meaning of constitutional terms as "authoritative," as his
own "pardon" example shows.
III. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Since no mention is made in the Constitution of a Congressional
power to investigate or an executive power to withhold information from
its partner in government, Congress, inquiry must perforce begin with the
scope of the respective powers in English practice. So the Supreme Court
did in a case arising out of the Teapot Dome scandal, McGrain v.
Daugherty,69 holding that at the adoption of the Constitution
the power of inquiry-with enforcing process-was regarded and employed
as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate .. . T]he
constitutional provisions which commit the legislative functions to the two
houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may
be effectively exercised.70
Mc Grain involved a Congressional subpoena to a private person and
therefore had no occasion to examine inquiry into executive misconduct.
Consequently I studied parliamentary investigations over a long period
and showed that Parliament was accustomed to peer into every corner of
66. Justice Story wrote that: "The policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or the policy of
another. The Constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uniform,
permanent construction. It should be . .. the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." I J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES § 426 (5th ed. 1905). A fixed Constitution
was for the Founders a basic postulate. See P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978).
In 1872, a unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee report, signed by Senators who had voted for
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments in Congress, stated: "A construction which would
give the phrase [in the fourteenth amendment] ... a meaning differing from the sense in which it was
understood and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as
unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express language of the Constitution in any other
particular." A. AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES preface at 2, 571 (1967). See
also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 693 (1964) ("[O]ur inquiry concerns the standard pre-
vailing at the time of the Constitution, not a score or more years later.")
67: IMPEACHMENT, supra note 2, at 53.
68. Fisher, supra note 1, at 185.
69. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
70. Id. at 175, quoted in EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 207 (emphasis added). Fisher's
comment exemplifies his "scholarly" approach: "From Mc Grain v. Daugherty (1927) [Berger] extracts
a statement that the British Parliament regarded the power to secure needed information-by
investigatory means-as an attribute of the power to legislate, . . . [h]avingprovedtohissatisfaction
that the power to investigate is grounded solidly in British constitutional history, ..."! Fisher, supra
note 1, at 186 (emphasis added). If McGrain is to be rejected, some reason needs to be adduced. That
this was the British practice I demonstrated in many pages.
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executive conduct 7' and that, but for one explicable instance,72 the British
executive had never resisted Parliament's requests for information. By the
logic of Mc Grain, the fact that the British executive did not claim the right
to withhold information from Parliament demonstrates that it was not an
attribute of the executive power conferred by the Constitution, and so it
was understood by the Founders. 73 This sufficiently answers Fisher's
"What is meant by a pre-1787 attribute of executive power?, 74 His
suggestion that "such precedents [could not] be discovered in America"
because "a separate national executive was not recognized by a
constitutional charter in the years prior to 1787"75 misconceives the test
Mc Grain employed with respect to the legislative power-whether a given
attribute existed in the prior British practice. Certainly the thoroughgoing
divorce of the President from crown prerogatives is irreconcilable with a
withholding power that was not recognized in England.
True to his "penchant" for "ignoring" unpalatable facts, Fisher skips
lightly over the summary of controlling history contained in my Reply to
Sofaer,76 which he confessedly read.7 7 Apart from the fact, as McGrain
held, that the investigatory power was an "attribute" of the "legislative
power," and that inquiry into executive conduct by Parliament ran across-
the-board, there are the facts that: (1) Montesquieu, the Founders' oracle
on the separation of powers, had stated that the legislature "has a right,
and ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws have
been executed." (2) James Wilson, second only to Madison as an architect
of the Constitution, had exalted the Commons as the Grand Inquest of the
Nation because it had "checked the progress of arbitrary power. . . .The
proudest ministers . . . have appeared at the bar of the house, to give an
account of their conduct." In the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention,
Wilson stated, "The executive power is better to be trusted when it has no
71. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 15-31. See also 3 H. HALLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 143 (1884), quoted in EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 18, and Charles
Davenant, quoted by Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Original
hltent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 558-59 (1974).
72. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 24-29.
73. See text accompanying note 76-78 infra. Executive privilege cannot be drawn from the blue.
Thus Madison directed attention to "the necessity of considering what privileges ought to be allowedto
the Executive." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 503 (emphasis added). In 1800, Charles Pinckney,
who had been an active Framer and Ratifier, explained to the Senate that the Convention well knew
"how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had been exercised in Great Britain, and were
determined no such authority should ever be exercised here." Accordingly, they confined the privileges
of Congress "within the narrow limits mentioned in the Constitution." To the President they did not
even allow the "privilege from arrest": "No privilege of this kind was intended for your
Executive .... 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 385. Against this background it is absurd to claim
for the President a privilege to withhold information that not even the English executive had enjoyed.
74. Fisher, supra note 1, at 186.
75. Id. In his haste, Fisher overlooked the colonial precedents, of which McGrain took
cognizance. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 31-34. But early American experience did not
exercise as much influence as the British practice. Id. at 34 n. 118.
76. Berger, Executive Privilege: A Reply to Professor Sofaer, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 609-10
(1975).
77. Fisher, supra note I, at 174 n.l.
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screen . . . [the President cannot] hide either his negligence or inatten-
tion . . . not a single privilege is annexed to his character." Such
representations were designed to reassure fearful Ratifiers. (3) References
to the House as the Grand Inquest of the Nation appear in the several
Conventions; not one voice was raised on behalf of curtailing the
inquisitorial power in the President's interest. (4) The Treasury Act of 1789
made the executive's duty to supply information explicit, an authoritative
construction by the First Congress.78 In the teeth of these and still other
facts Fisher asserts, "It is idle to pretend that the separation of powers
doctrine has no application to congressional inquiry. 79
Fisher's feeble attempt to diminish the import of this history only
underscores how little qualified he is to assay constitutional matters. Thus
he loftily brushes Montesquieu aside: "A statement from Montesquieu
does not constitute, for me, 'historical proof' "! Why not? Because
"[n]otwithstanding the praise bestowed on Montesquieu in the Federalist
Papers and at the Philadelphia Convention, the connection between his
writings and the American Constitution is quite tenuous. Clearly the
Framers departed from his model in fundamental ways." 80 But the fact that
Madison felt constrained to defend the Constitution against charges that it
departed from Montesquieu's alleged insistence on an airtight separation
of powers, testifies to the hold Montesquieu had on the Framers.8'
Montesquieu's espousal of the legislative power of investigating the
executive is evidence that even he did not consider that the separation of
powers barred legislative inquiry into executive conduct, and that it
therefore undergirded Madison's defense. Montesquieu's witness, so
slightingly regarded by Fisher, was viewed quite differently by the
Framers, to cite only two. Pierce Butler observed, "The great Montesquieu
says, it is unwise to entrust persons with power, which by being abused
operates to the advantage of those entrusted with it."'82 And Edmund
Randolph said, "What relates to suffrage is justly stated by the celebrated
Montesquieu as a fundamental article of Republican Govts.
83
While lustily flailing away at "strawmen," Fisher sets up a towering
one of his own, citing an early discredited case opposing Mc Grain, which
overruled it sub silentio, a lapse not suffered even in a fledgling lawyer. He
exhumes Kilbourn v. Thompson 4 for the proposition that Congress's
contempt power "can derive no support from" parliamentary practice,85
ignoring Mc Grain's overturn of Kilbourn's "neither house of Congress has
78. See note 76 upra.
79. Fisher, supra note 1, at 180.
80. Id.
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 314-15 (J. Madison) (Luce ed. 1976).
82. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 391 (1911).
83. Id. at 580. For a citation by Wilson, see 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 530.
84. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
85. Fisher, supra note 1, at 187.
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the power to make inquiries and exact evidence in aid of contemplated
legislation. 8 6 Fisher himself notes that in 1821 Anderson v. Dunn87
"recognized that Congress possessed a number of implied powers: the
power to investigate, . . . to compel a party's appearance, and the power
to punish for contempt."88 Kilbourn is regarded as historically unsound, 9
and the practice since McGrain, to cite only the Nixon 9 cases, evidences
that Congress has a power of investigation enforceable by contempt. 91
To my demonstration that the Treasury Act of 1789-which
instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to "give information to either
branch of the legislature . . . (as he may be required), respecting all
matters . . . which shall appertain to his office"-reflects the English
practice,92 Fisher replies that "Berger ignores the basic difference in the
statute creating the Foreign Affairs and War Departments . . . [which]
did not specifically require the Secretaries of those departments to furnish
information."93 So eager is Fisher to discredit Berger that he has been
betrayed into another reckless misstatement. For I did not "ignore" the
latter Departments but considered the difference at length and showed that
the "specific" Treasury provision was designed to forestall Hamilton's
feared tendency "to obtrude his sentiments perpetually on this body," and
therefore limited him to giving information "as he may be required. 94 No
reason to suspect such intrusiveness from the Foreign Affairs and War
Departments had appeared, and consequently no such declaratory
provision was called for.95 That the latter Departments were not exempted
from demands for information appears from an opinion of Attorney
General Cushing in 1854: "By express provision of law, it is made the duty
of the Secretary of the Treasury to communicate information to either
House of Congress when desired; and it is practically and by legal
implication the same with other secretaries. ,,96 How can a crusader
against "one-sidedness" "ignore" such facts?
Next Fisher refers to Washington's cabinet meeting to consider
Congress's request for information about the disastrous St. Clair
expedition. The information was turned over, but the cabinet concluded
86. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 171, 174 (1925).
87. 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S. 204 (1821).
88. Fisher, supra note 1, at 201-202; and see text accompanying notes 193-95 infra.
89. For citations see EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 31 n.101.
90. Nixon v. Administrator ofGen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974).
91. See also Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 865,
866-70 (1975).
92. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 38-40.
93. Fisher, supra note 1, at 180 (emphasis added).
94. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 38-40.
95. Id. at 198-200; see also Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1044, 1060-62 (1965).
96. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 200.
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that information could be withheld from Congress.97 There is no evidence
that this conclusion was ever disclosed to Congress; disclosure would
gratuitously have chilled relations with Congress. Jefferson's notes of the
meeting did not find their way into government files; they first came to light
after his death, and were published many years later.98 From these facts
Fisher concludes that, "[t]he principle of executive privilege, even if not
invoked, had been established"99-by a vest-pocket "decision." Since the
"principle" involves conflicting jurisdictional claims of Congress and the
President, he was not empowered unilaterally to settle such differences in
his own favor,'00 as the Nixon cases show. It is a measure of Fisher's
shallow learning that he is oblivious to such considerations.
For further rebuttal Fisher relies on Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
United States v. Nixon,' ° 1 in which he stated that the privilege for
presidential communications is "inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers" and that "the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to
require further discussion."'0 2 Eminent scholars chided Burger for
ignoring the historical data I had spread before him. 03 Against the
background of the Watergate scandal and the firestorm that swept the
nation after the "Saturday Night Massacre" (the abrupt firing of special
prosecutor Archibald Cox), withholding of the Nixon White House tapes
from the district court was unthinkable. So Burger grudgingly made a
breach in the separation of powers: the privilege "cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice.' 1 4 At the time I prophesied that this "principle" would
burgeon by analogy, that the public interest in the criminal prosecution of
a White House aide hardly rose to its interest in the "full disclosure of the
facts" before Congress when it is engaged in the impeachment of a
President, or currently, as in weighing ratification of SALT II (the missile
limitation agreement with Russia). 105 My prophecy was speedily fulfilled in
the second Nixon case, in which Nixon invoked executive privilege against
97. Id. at 167-68; Fisher supra note 1, at 180-81.
98. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 168-69.
99. Fisher, supra note 1, at 181 (emphasis added). Fisher adds a later "precedent in 1794, in
which Washington withheld from the Senate certain parts of correspondence between France and the
United States," citing one of his "authorities," Sofaer. Fisher, supra note 1, at 181 n. 12. Repetition of
an unwarranted claim does not convert it to a constitutional power. It is these "precedents" of which
Fisher says, "What counts is the executivepractice of withholding information from Congress .
Fisher, supra note 1, at 181.
100. In The Federalist, Madison stated that none of the departments "can pretend to an
exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers."THE FEDERALIST
No. 49 at 328 (J. Madison) (Luce ed. 1976). Neither department, Justice Jackson wrote, can"be left to
judge the limits of its own power." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 9 (1941).
101. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
102. Id. at 708, 705.
103. See Kurland, United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 68,74
(1974); Mishkin, Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 76, 83-84 (1974).
104. 418 U.S. at 713. Fisher makes no mention of this breach in the "principle," contrary to his
sage counsel that Berger should look to what courts do rather than what they say. See text
accompanying note 195 infra.
105. See Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 4, 8-9 (1974).
[Vol. 41:147
REPLY TO LOUIS FISHER
Congress to shield some forty million documents that had poured into the
White House from all quarters of the government. °6 Although Burger
insisted that a breach in presidential confidentiality was warranted only
when "the conduct of criminal proceedings would be impaired,' ' 7 the
Court, no longer constrained to furnish Nixon with a "unanimous"
decision that even he could not disobey,'l 8 held that "the claims of
Presidential privilege clearly must yield to the important congressional
purposes of preserving the materials and maintaining access to them for
lawful governmental and historical purposes."' 0 9 Protection of the public
right to information, upon which Nixon II was largely pitched, is not
nearly as important as the right of Congress to inquire into executive
misconduct, to ascertain the facts behind unauthorized entry into another
Vietnam war. Nixon helped to kill Cock Robin; no sooner had the
"doctrine" of executive privilege been born through Burger's midwifery
than it was rendered virtually meaningless. It is this learning that allegedly
"illustrates Berger's affinity for excesses [also "hyperbole"]." "There is
something tragic about a book," says Fisher, "that contains in its title and
general theme the proposition that executive privilege is a 'myth', ' 1° a
title I borrowed from George Ball, the respected Under Secretary of
State!"'
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Fisher is an adherent of a "living Constitution," of "adaptation by
usage, ' " 2 euphemisms for executive or judicial revision of the Constitu-
tion, designed to render palatable successive usurpations that were not
disclosed to the people.' 3 The shocking alternative, he stresses, "would
require hundreds of amendments to the Constitution" in place of judicial
construction of "ambiguities," for example, does the pardon grant "mean
full pardons only or may the President grant a conditional pardon.'' No
106. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
107. Id. at 515 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
108. See Mishkin, supra note 103, at 86-87.
109. 433 U.S. at 454.
110. Fisher, supra note 1, at 199.
11I. Although my citation to Ball is on the first page of Executive Privilege, Fisher comments, in
the "myth" context: "Perhaps others ... share Berger's view, but no name comes to mind." Fisher,
supra note 1, at 199. Professor Philip Kurland wrote, "[i]n the face of strong, if not conclusive, evidence
that 'executive privilege' is a 'myth,' as Professor Berger has asserted, the Court simply assumed its
existence." Kurland, supra note 103, at 74. The "tragedy" is that Fisher framed his indictment before he
looked at the evidence.
112. Fisher, supra note I, at 181.
113. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 88-100. Professor Kurland declared that "the most
immediate constitutional crisis of our present time [is] the usurpation by the judiciary of general
governmental powers on the pretext that its authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment."
Letter to Harvard University Press, August 15, 1977. Fisher, however, opines that "Berger worries
excessively about an uncontrolled judiciary." Fisher, supra note 1, at 182. An activist, Professor Henry
J. Abraham, "concur[s] with the heart of Berger's charge: that the judicial branch has indeed been
guilty of engaging in vital aspects ofgovernmental policy formation that are constitutionally delegated
to other branches, particularly the legislature." Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice at
any Cost"? The Judicial Role Revisited, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 472 (1979).
114. Fisher, supra note 1, at 182.
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one denies the need for judicial construction of ambiguities.15 The
usurpation consists in judicial amendment, such as substitution of "one
person-one vote" in place of the framers' unmistakable intention to leave
suffrage to the States." 6 The evidence that the framers meant to exclude
suffrage from the fourteenth amendment, first demonstrated in dissent by
Justice Harlan, and increasingly accepted as "irrefutable" even in activist
circles,' 7 is thus met by Fisher: "Holding to his position that the
Amendment excluded questions of suffrage, Berger takes issue with
Holmes' opinion" in Nixon v. Herndon.18 Nowhere does Holmes refer to
the legislative history that is clearly to the contrary; even a revered Justice
may not contradict the intention of the framers, as Holmes would have
been the first to agree.' 9 This history Fisher treats as a "straw man," a
"false premise" that the Justices have acted "in direct contradiction of the
plain intention of the Framers." But to promulgate "one person-one
vote" in the teeth of the framers' intention to exclude suffrage
incontrovertibly is "in direct contradiction" of the plain intention of the
framers. 20 It is childish to assimilate my demonstration that "one
person-one vote" is irreconcilable with the framers' unmistakable
exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment with "the
115. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 284.
116. Of this Justice Harlan stated: "When the Court disregards the express intent and
understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending
power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to
protect." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring and dissenting in part).
Such views are not to be ridiculed as "another straw man." Fisher, supra note I, at 182-83.
117. For citations see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw.
U.L. REv. 311-12 (1979). Professor Henry Abraham states: "[A]ny genuinely objective, factual and
rigorous examination of the debates and history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
demonstrates that the authors and supporters of that provision specifically rejected its application to
segregated schools and the franchise, that, to the contrary, they designed the Amendment 'to leave
suffrage and segregation beyond federal control, to leave it with the States.' "Abraham, supra note
113, at 467-68. See also Perry, supra note 7, at 687-88.
118. Fisher, supra note 1, at 194 (emphasis added).
119. Holmes held that when a legislature "has intimated its will, however, indirectly, that will
should be recognized and obeyed . . . it is notan adequate discharge ofdutyforcourts to say:'Wesee
what you are driving at, but you have not said it.' "GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 369.
See also text accompanying note 149 infra.
120. See Justice Harlan's remarks in note 116 supra. Another reference to the suffrage-
segregation issue is Fisher's invocation of Hermine Herta Meyer's "more objective and coherent
[analysis] than Berger's treatment." Fisher, supra note 1, at 197. But Meyer reads against him: "[S]he
independently reaches the same conclusion that the Supreme Court has misused the Amendment in
applying it to voting rights and segregation at the state levels, [but] she finds the Brown decision
'acceptable' on the theory that there should be no classification according to race.'" Id. (emphasis
added). If, however, the amendment was "misapplied," segregation is outside the reach of
"classification," a post-1866 judicial construct. Stripped of pejoratives, Fisher states Meyer's view that
"the Fourteenth Amendment was conceived in ambiguity and confusion," instancing "the discrepancy
between what its language says and what its framers said it was supposed to mean." Id. What the
"framers said it was supposed to mean" cures the "ambiguity." If I may trade primer law with Fisher,
the Court has held that "A thing may be within the letter of a statute and not within its meaning, and
within its meaning though not within its letter. The intention of the lawmaker is the law." Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 7-8 n.24
(emphasis added); and see the remarks of Justice Holmes, note 119 supra. Throughout Fisher praises
those who differ with me, see, e.g., Fisher, supra note 1, at 185 n.24, but ignores those who agree with
me, rendering his attacks on my "onesidedness" sheer cant.
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mechanical task of placing statutes alongside the Constitution to see that
[they] conform.'' If a given provision of the Constitution is ambiguous
such a comparison is of course unilluminating; but that cannot be said of
an express prohibition or limitation, or of the unmistakable intention to
exclude suffrage with the "one person-one vote" doctrine.
Another example of Fisher's skewed evaluation of constitutional
materials is disclosed by his comment on my statement that in Reynolds v.
Sims 22 the Supreme Court "violated the injunction of the separation of
powers, 'made explicit in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, that "the
judiciary shall never exercise the legislative power." ' '' "Since when," he
fatuously asks, "is the Supreme Court bound by the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 '123 That constitution merely articulated what
Madison later expressed in the Convention, the general assumption that it
was "essential to the preservation of liberty [echoing Montesquieu] that
the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate ... ,124 In the First
Congress Madison repeated the "1780" formulation virtually in haec
verba.125 And he there repeated that "if there is a principle in our
Constitution, more sacred than another, it is that which separates the
Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers.' 26 Of this Fisher patronizing-
ly states, "Anyone familiar with the adoption of the Bill of Rights
understands that the kind of language found in Article XXX [of the
Massachusetts Constitution] was rejected by the First Congress"; it was
"struck from the list of amendments submitted to the States for
ratification."'t27 This amendment, as he noticed, was submitted by the
House to the Senate. There it was struck, as was a "substitute amendment
(to make the three departments 'separate and distinct' . . . )" without
recorded discussion. 28 Patently no "rejection" by the First Congress could
abrogate what was regarded as a central principle by the Framers, to which
Madison had again referred in Federalist No. 47 as the "maxim, that the
121. Fisher, supra note 1, at 190.
122. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
123. Fisher, supra note 1, at 179.
124. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 23, at 34. John Dickinson likewise considered that "the
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary departments ought to be made as independent as possible ... "
I M. FARRAND, id. at 86. For other expressions to the same effect, see I M. FARRAND, id. at 393 ("we
have constantly endeavoured to keep distinct the three great branches of government") (Mr. Gerry);
2 M. FARRAND, id. at 36 n.*, 56 (Mr. Madison); id. at 66 (Mr. King); id. at 537 ("as separate as pos-
sible") (Col. Mason); 3 M. FARRAND, id. at 108 ("separate and distinct") (Mr. Pinckney); id. at 341
(Mr. Davie).
125. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435-36 (1789) (Gales & Seaton ed. 1836) (print bearing running title
"History of Congress").
126. Id. at 581.
127. Fisher, supra note 1, at 179 (emphasis added).
128. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 25-26 (1972) (emphasis added). Fisher argues that the
motivation was "to protect against legislative usurpations ... [not] fear of executive power." Id. at
26. Be that assumed and it does not follow that theprinciple does not bar executive usurpation, forthe
Founders had even less stomach for Executive encroachments on the legislature. In THE FEDERALIST
No. 51 at 338 (J. Madison) (Luce ed. 1976), Madison wrote, "In republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates."
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legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and
distinct." Minimally, such abrogation required specific expression.
129
Having thus read the separation of powers out of the Constitution,
Fisher astonishingly asserts on the very next page, "It is idle to pretend that
the separation of powers doctrine has no application to congressional
inquiry." 130 Of course, the separation of powers remains vital, as the
Supreme Court attested in 1974, in terms reminiscent of the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution:
[T]he judicial Power ...vested in the federal courts ...can no more be
shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can
share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other
conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers
and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite
government. The Federalist No. 47 . .
But the separation of powers does not generate power; instead it poses the
crucial question: What is the content of each of the three "separate"
segments, for example, if the power to veto is executive, it cannot be
"shared" with the judiciary. Consequently we must turn to English practice
for the content of the respective powers.
Fisher taxes me with failure to "offer constructive solutions to the
problem of malapportionment .. . to descend to the real world and
confront the crises that exist," with failure to refer to "some of the major
events between 1946 and 1964. '' 3 With Marshall I hold that the
"constitution . ..was not intended to furnish the corrective for every
abuse of power which may be committed by the State governments.' 33
129. Chief Justice Marshall held that "an opinion which is ... to establish a principle never
before recognized, should be expressed in plain and explicit terms." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
55, 165 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 693). The case is even stronger against rejection of a "recognized"
principle. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1965).
130. Fisher, supra note I, at 180.
131. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974). Doubtless Fisher would count this
citation as one of my "inconsistencies" because the case, contrary to my opinion, adopted the view that
the President has a "qualified" privilege to withhold information. See text at notes 101-09 supra. But
agreement on a basic principle-separation of powers-does not require concurrence in dubious
deductions therefrom.
132. Fisher, supra note 1, at 196, 195. Respectable commentators consider that the
malapportionment "crisis" was blown up. W. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974).
For further criticism of some ill-considered assumptions, see A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 109-16, 151-62 (1978).
133. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 379. Where Fisher would have the Court
supply what the Constitution lacks-in Fisher's chaste terms, to function "not merely as a nay-sayer"
but to "suggest more appropriate options," Fisher, supra note 1, at 196-I hold with Madison: "Had
the power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the
defect could only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the Constitution."
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 381 n.32.
Fisher praises Bickel for "offering alternative courses of action" despite his sharp criticism of the
desegregation decision, Fisher, supra note 1, at 196-97. That alternative was a tentative hypothesis:
possibly the framers of the fourteenth amendment employed "open-ended" terms in order to enable
posterity to reverse their exclusion of segregation. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2. at
100-10. Professor Michael Perry has written: "Berger's exhaustive study of the legislative
history . ..discloses no reliable support for this open-endedness claim. In fact, the evidence quite
clearly points the other way . Perry, supra note 7, at 691. See also Fisher's own witness Herta
Meyer, supra note 120.
REPLY TO LOUIS FISHER
Much less does it authorize the Court to amend the Constitution for that
purpose. What it does provide is amendment by the people. Fisher is
disquieted because "[i]f Congress decided not to invoke its 'ample powers'
[?] what then-sit back and tolerate systematic disfranchisement. What
could be more hostile to a democratic system?"'134 Unauthorized judicial
amendment of the Constitution is worse. Prior to 1940, activist Stanley
Kutler wrote, liberals condemned the Justices for "arrogat[ing] a
policymaking function not conferred upon them by the Constitution."'35
Such arrogation smells no more sweet when it satisfies Fisher's aspirations.
Action in excess of delegated power is no more tolerable in a Chief Justice
Warren than in a Richard Nixon. 136 Constitutional construction must not
turn on whose ox is gored. As President Washington cautioned in his
Farewell Address,
let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance may be
the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free
governments are destroyed. The precedent must always overbalance in
permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time
yield. 37
Fisher twits me with inconsistency in insisting that the 600-year-long
practice of a twelve-man jury furnishes the criterion for "trial by jury"
while rejecting "adaptation by usage," an historical practice of "alter[ing]
our Constitution, especially when the practice has been accepted by the
people." '3 He cannot distinguish between looking to English practice for
the meaning of a common law term (as he does for the "pardon" power)
and post-Constitution alteration of such meaning by the courts,'39 which
constitutes judicial amendment. Nor wasjudicial "alteration" "accepted by
the people." They could hardly accept what was never disclosed. The Court
has never told them that it was "altering" the Constitution; it has
steadfastly maintained that it was only giving effect to, not revising, it.
1 40
What is not disclosed, the law teaches, is not ratified.14' Moreover, as
Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 78, even knowledge of the people's will
does not authorize their representatives to dispense with the amendment
process in conformity with Article V. 142 No power to circumvent this
process was conferred upon the Court.
134. Fisher, supra note 1, at 196.
135. Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical?, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 511, 512 (1979).
136. Leonard Levy stated that "result-oriented jurisprudence ... [is a] judicial monstrosity
that gains nothing when the Court reaches a just result merely because of its identification with
underdog litigants." GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 343.
137. Id. at 299.
138. Fisher, supra note 1, at 182.
139. See note 66 supra.
140. For similar views of Professors Felix Frankfurter and Robert Bork, see GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 281 n.143, 319. For Justice Jackson, see id. at 130.
141. Id. at 155 n.93.
142. "Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the
established law, it is binding ... and no presumption or even knowledge of their sentiments, can
warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act." Id. at 316.
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My demonstration that the "nay-saying function [of the Court]
should not expand into a legislative, policymaking role," is rejected by
Fisher; he spurns a "dichotomy between 'naysaying' (permissible) and
'initiating' [national policy] (impermissible),' 43 thereby exposing his
ignorance of basic principles, of the distinction between declaring
legislation unconstitutional because beyond the power conferred and a
judicial takeover of legislative policymaking. Justice James Iredell, who
anticipated Hamilton's defense of judicial review, stated, "The power of
the legislatures is limited" by the several Constitutions:
Beyond these limitations ...their acts are void, because they are not
warranted by the authority given. But within them, I think, they are in all
cases obligatory ...because ...the legislatures only exercise a discre-
tion expressly confided to them by the constitution. . . . It is a discretion no
more controllable [or exercisable ...by a court ofjustice, than a judicial
determination is by them ....44
That distinction, rooted in the Constitution, 145 was reaffirmed by James
Bradley Thayer, Judge Learned Hand, 146 and was recently reiterated by
Professor Archibald Cox. Cox observed that "[t]hroughout most of our
history the form of the Supreme Court's contributions to public policy was
negative," that "where the older activist decisions merely blocked
legislative initiatives, the decisions of the 1950's and 1960's forced changes
in the established order."1 47 Fisher counters with Judge Cardozo's
statement: "Within limits a judge legislates, and does so in a creative, not
merely a negative, way."'148 Cardozo wrote in the frame of judicial
administration of the common law, for example, torts and contracts,
traditionally left to the courts, subject to being overruled by Parliament.
Even so, Justice Holmes held, "judges do and must legislate, but they can
do so interstitially . . . .A common law judge could not say I think the
doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce
it.' 149 Even less is a court authorized to set aside the unmistakable
intention of the Framers. As said by an ardent apologist for the Warren
Court, Judge J. Skelly Wright, respecting "constitutional choices," "the
most important value choices have already been made by the framers of the
143. Fisher, supra note 1, at 188.
144. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,265 (1796) (emphasis added);see also United States v.
Nixon, quoted in the text accompanying note 131 supra.
145. The Convention distinguished between laws that were merely "pernicious," "unwise," and
those that were unconstitutional. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 301.
146. Id. at 305.
147. Id. at 305 n.27, 428.
148. Fisher, supra note 1, at 188 (emphasis added), citing B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 113-15 (1921). Cardozo wrote that judges do not have "the right, to ignore the man-
date of a statute, and render judgment in despite of it." Id. at 129.
149. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 321 n.32. Oblivious of such learning, Fisher
pulls out another Jack Homer plum: "It is too late in the day to pretend thatjudges'find' the law rather
than 'make' it," illustrating by Jeremiah Smith's classic reply to "Do judges make law?" "Course they
do. Made some myself." Fisher, supra note 1, at 189. But Smith laid no claim of power to revise a
Constitution, and that is what is in issue.
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Constitution," and judicial value choices "are to be made only within the
parameters" of those choices. 50 Fisher is free to entertain a contrary view,
but he will be hard put to produce one candid claim by the Court of power
to displace the Framers' choices by its own.
Fisher chides me for failing to advert to the cases that paved the way to
Brown v. Board of Education, "' which show that "U]udicial policy making
is not an invention of the Warren Court."'152 But usurpation is not
legitimated by repetition.53 No chain is stronger than its weakest link; the
first and the last cases equally fail if they are in contravention of the
Framers' intention. Another sophomoric Fisher observation is, "Berger
urges us to look at the Constitution itself, 'stripped of judicial
incrustations.' A nice phrase, but elsewhere his writings are filled with
court rulings that support his conclusions. . .'4 The "nice phrase" was
a paraphrase of then Solicitor General Robert Jackson's comparison of
the recent emergence of the constitutional text (after the eclipse of the Four
Horsemen) from beneath a laissez faire gloss to the rediscovery of an old
master after the retouching brushwork of succeeding masters has been
removed.' 55 Since then Justices as divergent as Burger, Douglas, and
Frankfurter have claimed the right to look at the Constitution rather than
what their predecessors have said about it.'56 It is one thing to cite cases
that confirm the historical evidence and something else again to reject
those that revise the Constitution in the face of the historical evidence, a
distinction that escapes Fisher. 5 7 Concurring opinions are not discredited
because of dissent in part.
Fisher summarily dismisses effectuation of the "original intention"
remarking that we cannot "seek guidance on every issue as understood by
men who lived two centuries ago without taking into account the changes
in our own political culture since that time."'158 Test that by the
unmistakable intention in 1866 to exclude suffrage from the fourteenth
amendment: where is the Court authorized to override that intention in
order, as Justice Black sarcastically stated, "to keep the Constitution in
150. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 322 (emphasis added).
151. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
152. Fisher, supra note 1, at 190, 192-93.
153. "That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely does not render that same
action any less unconstitutional at a later date." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
Professor Nathaniel Nathanson wrote that Bickel "quite convincingly demonstrated ... that
the Fourteenth Amendment ...would not require school desegregation," and that "Berger's
independent research and analysis confirm and also adds weight to those conclusions." Nathanson,
Book Review, 56 TEXAS L. REv. 579,580-81 (1978). An ardent proponent of the desegregation decision,
Howard Jay Graham, conceded that his view was not entertained in 1866. See Berger, The Scope of
Judicial Review:An Ongoing Debate, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 597 (1979);seealso note 117supra.
154. Fisher, supra note 1, at 191.
155. Jackson, Back to the Constitution, 25 A.B.A.J. 745 (1939).
156. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 344.
157. Compare note 30 supra.
158. Fisher, supra note I, at 191 (emphasis added).
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tune with the times.' ' 159 Nor is it every issue that can be illuminated by
legislative history; oftimes the history is inconclusive; but the case is
different where the framers leave an unequivocal record of their intentions.
Further to discredit the "original intention," Fisher invokes Dred Scott v.
Sandford.6 Dred Scott was execrated not because it employed the wrong
rule of interpretation but because, as George Bancroft wrote, Chief Justice
Taney sought "to come to the rescue of the theory of slavery."'161 The case,
Professor Wallace Mendelson observes, constitutes a "warning to judges"
against an "attempt to impose extra-constitutional policies upon the
community under the guise of interpretation, ' 162 precisely the course on
which Fisher is embarked.
He stamps as "one-sided" my showing that a powerful underlying
reason for the narrow scope of the fourteenth amendment was that the
North was shot through with Negrophobia-an undeniable fact' 6 3 -
because "there was obviously, operating at the same time, a deep
repugnance to Slave Codes and Black Codes," making "it incomprehensi-
ble why Congress and the States" would add the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. 164 The Black Codes were designed to return the liberated
Negroes to slavery, to serfdom; they were, said Senator Henry Wilson,
"nearly as iniquitous as the old slave codes,' 65 designed to keep the Negro
"as near to the condition of slavery as possible.' 66 This the framers meant
to outlaw, 167 and for that purpose to enable the Negro to own property, to
contract for his labor, and to have access to the courts for protection of
those interests, rights the Black Codes denied, and which were first
embedded in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.168 The consensus was expressed
by Senator James W. Patterson of New Hampshire; he was "opposed to
any law discriminating against [blacks] in the security and protection of
life, liberty, person, and property," but stated that "beyond this I am not
prepared to go," explicitly rejecting "political and social equality."'169
159. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 101 n.9.
160. Fisher, supra note I, at 191-92, citing 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
161. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 222 n.4.
162. Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment-Abuse by Contraction, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 437,453 (1979); seealso Berger,supra note 117, at350-51. Fishercites Bickel's reference to
Dred Scott as illustrating the evils of resort to the"original intention." Fisher, supra note 1, at 192 n.38.
That reference was in 1955; subsequently he referred to "the misbegotten attempt in the DredScott case
to put the riven society back together." A. BICKEL, supra note 132, at 178.
163. A Reconstruction historian, Harold Hyman, wrote, "Negrophobia tended to hold even the
sparse Reconstruction that the nation created at low throttle, and played a part in Reconstruction
incompleteness." GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 233 n. 17. For more forcibly expressed
views to the same effect by William Gillette, see Berger, supra note 117, at 312-13.
164. Fisher, supra note 1, at 194.
165. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 25.
166. Id. at 25 n.19.
167. Id. at 25-26.
168. Id. at 24.
169. Id at 170-71 (emphasis added). Proposals to bar alldiscrimination were repeatedly rejected,
id. at 163-64.
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Whether history bears out this recital is not nearly as important for my
thesis as the fact that suffrage and segregation170 were excluded from the
scope of the fourteenth amendment. Let Fisher explain why this was so.
V. CARPING CRITICISM
Having throughout "proved to his [own] satisfaction"' 7' that
"[c]oexistent with [Berger's] quest for dispassionate analysis is a penchant
for polemics, hyperbole, and literary gerrymandering," Fisher concludes
that those "qualities . . . need to be underscored.' 72 Not content,
therefore, with exposing mistaken judgments or incompetence in
evaluation of constitutional materials, Fisher devotes his last six pages to
pure denigration. His bill of particulars merits consideration if only
because it betrays the bias that has crippled his analysis and rendered him
unfit to instruct his brethren. And it further reveals his incapacity to
discriminate.
He launches his criticism of my "unidimensional lawyer brief" by an
attack on my "penchant for polemics." As evidence of my "crusading
spirit" he quotes my statement that" a polemical tone is inescapable; a
student of history can no more avoid criticism of views which seem to him
erroneous than did the chemists who disputed the tenability of the
phlogiston theory of combustion."'173 That can rest on the example of the
distinguished historian, Charles McIlwain, who explained that during the
course of his study of the High Court of Parliament,
I came to the conclusion that the weight of contemporary evidence was
against some views held by men whom I have always looked up to . . . . As
these divergences . . . concerned things which are the very marrow of the
subject under discussion, this has unavoidably given to certain parts of the
book a polemical cast. .... 174
Instead of probing whether my criticism distorted or misrepresented the
views of others or whether I was mistaken, 17 Fisher pettishly devotes
himself to my rhetoric. Thus he instances my comment on an "unfriendly
reviewer . . . 'Paul Brest-a young man in a hurry.' ,,176 Brest had
170. See note 153 supra.
171. The phrase is borrowed from Fisher, supra note 1, at 186.
172. Id. at 198.
173. Id.
174. C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY ix (1910).
175. Professor Perry concluded that "Berger is meticulous in exploring [the records of the 39th
Congress]; he does not merely announce conclusions, but marshals the evidence (statements by the
framers) for the reader, without ignoring conflicting evidence." Perry, supra note 7, at 688. Professor
Donald Kommers wrote, "Berger's careful scouring of the record and his incisive critique of what he
regards as the misuse of that record by others seriously undermines the conventional wisdom
concerning the intent of the Fourteenth [Amendment]." Kommers, Book Review, supra note7, at413.
Earlier Professor Alpheus Thomas Mason had written of my 1969 study, "Berger takes on all
comers . . . . [His] critical analysis is, by and large persuasive-sometimes devastating."
IMPEACIIMENT, supra note 2, dust jacket.
176. Fisher, supra note 1, at 198.
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charged that my Government by Judiciary "persistently distorted [the
historical data] to support [my] thesis," that I exhibited "fancy footwork
against the text," indulged in "brief parodies of opposing theories." 17 My
response was hardly an over-reaction. Of the same order is Fisher's: "Also
ad hominem is [Berger's] reaction to what he regards as a 'rancorous
review' by Ralph Winter, who Berger claims 'substitutes derision and
expletives for analysis.' In defense, Bergersimply notes that Winter's views
'run counter to those of more distinguished reviewers.' ,,178 This grossly
misrepresents my point-by-point refutation, running sixteen to seventeen
pages. Illustrative of Winter's rancor was his alignment of my views
respecting executive privilege with those of the "John Birch Society," with
"those who would have impeached Earl Warren."'179 Why are Brest and
Winter "much abused" whereas my reply to unfair denigration
demonstrates a "petulant and pugnacious quality?"' 80
To illustrate my "proclivity for ridicule" Fisher states that a
memorandum by Deputy Attorney General William Rogers, claiming
uncontrolled presidential discretion to withhold information, "receives
this evaluation from Berger: 'it is a farrago of internal contradictions,
patently slipshod analysis, and untenable inferences.' ,,"1 Sofaer, one of
Fisher's "authorities," referred to my "devastating barrage of criticism" of
Rogers' "precedents for executive resistance," which Berger "so ably leaves
in ruins."' 12 To such evidence Fisher turns a blind eye. J.W.N. Sullivan, an
eminent British scientist, wrote that one of the glories of science is "its one
simple but devastating criterion, 'Is it true?' ,,183 Fisher would have been
better occupied testing my proof instead of captiously deploring my
rhetoric. My statement that Rogers' claim of "absolute 'uncontrolled'
presidential discretion to withhold information" was untenable as was
"confirmed . . .in United States v. Nixon," is labelled as "grossly
misleading. The fact that Rogers was wrong does not make Berger
right." 84 But the Supreme Court's confirmation of my view shows (to one
like Fisher who worships at the feet of judicial cases) that "Berger [was]
right." "Moreover," Fisher continues, "although the Court dismissed an
absolute claim for constitutional privilege, surely it parted company with
Berger by recognizing a qualified privilege."' 85 That, however, does not
177. Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, December 11, 1977, § 7, at 10. Commenting on Brest's
charge that Berger "persistently distorted [the historical data] to support his thesis," Professor Perry
wrote, "This is a grave charge, and I cannot myself see the basis for it." Perry, supra note 7, at 689 n. 14.
See also note 175 supra.
178. Fisher, supra note 1, at 202 (emphasis added).
179. Berger, Executive Privilege: Some Counter Criticism, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 166, 168 (1975).
180. Fisher, supra note 1, at 198.
181. Id. at 199.
182. Sofaer, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 281, 288 (1974).
183. J. SULLIVAN, THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE 174 (Mentor ed. 1933).
184. Fisher, supra note 1, at 199.
185. Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added).
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make my statement that the Court rejected "uncontrolled" discretion
"grossly misleading." And as we have seen, the Court, in the second Nixon
case, left little of the "qualified" privilege standing.
8 6
Fisher apparently finds it a mark of inconsistency that in my books I
"look with alarm at each of the three branches," successively emphasizing
"congressional tyranny," "executive tyranny," and "judicial tyranny. 187
There is no inconsistency in criticizing action in excess of power by each of
the three branches; such excesses are no more justifiable in an Earl Warren
than in a Richard Nixon. Of my observation that the Court's substitution
of its own policies for the choices of the framers (for example, its
promulgation of the "one person-one vote" doctrine in manifest
contradiction of the framers' undeniable exclusion of suffrage from the
fourteenth amendment) "should be submitted in plainspoken fashion to
the people" for approval of government by judiciary, Fisher exclaims that
this is an "extravagant statement," a "straw man," because "[n]o one
responsibly argues for 'government by judiciary' (whatever that
means) . ,,1*."' It means substitution of the judicial will for that of the
framers, the takeover of legislative functions, as he himself urged. t8 9
Academe makes no bones about turning government over to the Court. A
fellow activist, Robert Cover, wrote that a reading of the Constitution
must stand or fall not upon the Constitution's self-evident
meaning .. . .[I]t is for us, not the framers, to decide whether that end of
liberty is best served by entrusting to judges a major role in defining our
governing political ideas and in measuring ...[legislative action] in
majoritarian politics against that ideology. 190
Such views are endemic in academe.' 91 So busy was Fisher with culling
condemnatory phrases from my critics that he never paused to ask: Who
"entrusted" the judges with this awesome power?
Another example of alleged inconsistency, which again reveals
Fisher's inability to discriminate, is that "Berger holds discordant
views .. .he is highly critical of freewheeling interpretations by Justices
186. See text accompanying notes 101-09 supra.
187. Fisher, supra note 1, at 200.
188. Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
189. See text accompanying note 134 supra. Justice Harlan, who may be regarded as a
"responsible"jurist, said much the same as I did. See note 1 16supra. Dean Carl Auerbach, who regards
the reapportionment decision with favor, lamented that "the failure of the Court to mention, let alone
deal with, [Harlan's] argument is indeed, as he charged, remarkable and confounding." GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 54. Fisher himself notes that "In 1895, in the Income Tax case, Justice
White (joined by Harlan) charged that the Court had amended the Constitution byjudicial fiat .. "
Fisher, supra note 1, at 189. What is this but government by judiciary. To be sure, Fisher adduces this
example to show that "U]udicial policymaking is not an invention of the Warren Court," id. at 190, as if
misconduct can be legitimated by earlier infractions. And he remains oblivious that in setting the
income tax law aside the Court was engaged in "nay-saying," not in initiating policy.
190. Book Review, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27.
191. Academe's endowment of the Justices with "the constitutional function of countering the
democratic process" was candidly acknowledged by Professor Arthur Sutherland. GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 312-13. See also text accompanying note 210 infra.
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who impose their own predilections upon the public," but in his
Impeachment "Berger discovers magical powers of judicious calm and
sweet reasonableness in the courts."' 92 That one should prefer a trial by a
court rather than by the politicized Senate that tried Andrew Johnson is
not "discordant" with rejection of judicial displacement of policy choices
by the Framers. Trials are a traditional judicial staple; constitutional
revision is not.
"Literary gerrymandering" is allegedly demonstrated by my quota-
tion from Anderson v. Dunn, 93 "the genius and spirit -of our institutions
are hostile to the exercise of implied powers."' 94 A "dandy statement,"
Fisher remarks, "for Berger can use it to decry the use of the doctrine of
implied powers when applied to executive privilege. But . . . it is
fundamental to look at what the Court did and not simply what it said."' 95
To instruct a veteran lawyer in so elementary a proposition is laughable-
Little Jack Homer redivivus! 196 And what did the court do? It "recognized
that Congress possessed a number of implied powers: the power to
investigate, to issue warrants, to compel a party's appearance, and the
power to punish for contempt,"'197 all bottomed on the English pre-1787
practice. 98 Would that Fisher had brought forth a similar history for a
presidential implied power to withhold information. But, alas, English
history affords Fisher small comfort.
Additional evidence of "gerrymandering" is that Berger is "in-
discriminate in reaching out for 'evidence,' . . . [he] relies on Myres
McDougal in Government by Judiciary after excoriating him in Executive
Privilege.'99 In the former I cited McDougal for a truism: The American
people are averse to "government by a self-designated elite";200 in the latter
I demonstrated that his substitution of "executive agreements" with
foreign powers for treaties, unconstitutionally excluded Senate participa-
tion in treatymaking contrary to the Founders' intention.2 °' One can not
192. Fisher, supra note 1, at 190.
193. 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S. 204 (1821).
194. Id. at 225.
195. Fisher, supra note 1, at 201.
196. Though I had made the point earlier, Fisher commented, "When someone outside the legal
profession [Joseph Cooper] had the nerve to challenge Berger's scholarship he was tossed to the side
with this rejoinder: 'A veteran lawyer may be permitted to smile when lectured by a political scientist.'"
Id. at 199. This is a torn-from-context comment, gleaned from a 16-page detailed refutation, on
Cooper's statement that the "arising under" clause "has never been understood to mean every
conceivable case, but only those cases properly within the judicial sphere," i.e., "cases or
controversies." Apparently Fisher is equally unaware that this is a law student's primer learning, that to
belabor a veteran lawyer with such bromides exhibits callowness. Political scientists who mistake such
banalities for profundity discredit their profession.
197. Id. at 201.
198. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), quoted in text accompanying note 70
supra; and Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1942).
199. Fisher, supra note 1, at 202.
200. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 314.
201. See EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 140-52.
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make a mule a horse by calling it a horse.20 2 Fisher simply cannot conceive
that to concur in part and dissent in part does not evidence double dealing.
Under the head of "literary gerrymandering" Fisher further states:
As though uncertain of his case, Berger constantly associates himself
with men of eminence. . . . Berger especially likes to fraternize with
illustrious members of the Court [is this not "ridicule"]. At one time he
remarks: 'Like Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, I
assert the right to look at the Constitution itself, stripped of judicial
incrustations,' while at another point he suggests that a critic 'might have
added that Berger does not stand alone but is in the company of Justice
Holmes, Justice Frankfurter, and Judge Learned Hand.' 20 3
Anticipating that my critics, whom Fisher parrots, would say as he himself
does, "[h]aving proved to his satisfaction," "[a]ccording to Berger,"
"[h]olding to his position that the Amendment excluded questions of
suffrage, ' 204 to indicate that my views were eccentric and without support,
I sought throughout to show that my documentation corresponded with
the views of "eminent" men. At least, unlike Fisher, I analyzed the facts
and opposing opinions.205 Nor do my citations to "eminent" men stand
lower than Fisher's to my critics. Even-handed, "solid scholarship" bars a
double standard in this and other instances.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fisher's attempted demolition of my scholarly "reliability" has in-
stead revealed his own serious shortcomings-his inability to distinguish
between different facts, even to understand the thrust of his own citations,
and his unwillingness to face up to discrepant facts and opinions. His
essay is a pastiche of expletives culled from my critics, with never a look
at my dissection of their counterarguments. That so ill-equipped a critic
should undertake to instruct his political science brethren in the intricacies
of constitutional law is an insult to his profession. Constitutional analysis
requires more than a few rags and tags of primer precepts-look at what
courts do, not what they say; courts do not discover but make the law.
Great issues are obscured by such trivia.
Consider executive privilege, which he seeks to rescue from the ill
repute of Nixon's excesses. Former Solicitor Generhl Archibald Cox
observed that "control over the release of information is a critical factor in
202. Professor Philip Kurland asked: "Should the Constitution really be read to mean that by
calling an agreement an executive agreement rather than a treaty, the obligation to secure Senate
approval is dissolved?" EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 2, at 145. Seealso L. HENKIN, supra note 23,
at 179.
203. Fisher, supra note 1, at 202. Fisher harps on this theme: "As though uncertain of his case,
Berger constantly associates himself with men of eminence." Fisher, supra note 1, at 202. Berger
"surrounds himself with oracles instead of demonstrating to the reader . . . the cogency of his
argument." Id. at 203.
204. Id. at 186, 175, 194 (emphasis added).
205. See note 175 supra.
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wielding governmental power. . . .A President' power to bomb a small
and distant country is greater if the bombing can be kept secret than if
will be detailed in public. '206 Nowhere does Fisher explain where or why
the President is "impliedly" empowered to withhold such vital "secrets"
from his partner in government, the Congress. Instead he cites Nixon I
without noticing that it was virtually emasculated by Nixon 11.207 This is
"scholarship"?
His views on government by judiciary reflect the "new faith," which
turned its back on Academe's earlier excoriation of judicial arrogation of a
"policymaking function not conferred upon [the courts] by the Constitu-
tion," "negat[ing] the basic principles of representative government. 203
Because he considers that something simply had to be done about
malapportionment, he averts his eyes from the threshold question:
whence does the Court derive power to reverse the framers' decision to
withhold power over suffrage. Instead, in his wooly fashion he equates his
wishes with constitutional power to effectuate them. A more
"sophisticated" 209 activist, Professor E.G. White, candidly asks: "[W]hy
should it [the Court] not openly acknowledge that the source of [newly-
invented rights] is not the constitutional text but the enhanced seriousness
of certain values in American society, 210 never mind that, as in the case of
busing, there is widespread opposition to those "values." Whence does the
Constitution confer such power on the Court? Scholars-not including
Fisher-are groping for answers. Professor Louis Lusky would explain the
Court's "assertion of the power to revise the Constitution, bypassing the
cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by article V," by
attributing to the Founders an intention "to empower the Court to serve as
the Founders' surrogate for the indefinite future . . .,,,211 "conforming
the Constitution to what its makers would . . . have
prescribed .. .had they been living and acting in the middle of the 20th
century.212 This begs the question: where was that intention evidenced?
The historical evidence is that the Court was excluded from participation
in policymaking, from acting as a continuing constitutional convention.
2 13
206. Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1430, 1431 (1974).
207. See text accompanying notes 101-09 supra.
208. Kutler, supra note 135, at 512.
209. Fisher, supra note 1, at 196 n.48.
210. White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme Court: The Contemporary Debate and the
"Lessons" of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 168 (1979). Baldly stated, this means cramming down the
throat of a resisting public such "values" as busing. Crane Brinton wrote of Robespierre: "If
Frenchmen would not be free and virtuous voluntarily then he would force them to be free and cram
virtue down their throats." 2 C. BRINTON, J. CHRISTOPHER & R. WOLFF, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION
115 (1955).
211. L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 21 (1975).
212. Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 403,
406 (1979); LUSKY, supra note 211.
213. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 300-11. Indeed Lusky rejects the "notion
that the Supreme Court can legitimately function as a continuing constitutional convention ...."
Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.403,4! 1(1979).
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REPLY TO LOUIS FISHER
Professor John Hart Ely finds that the framers of the fourteenth
amendment issued an "invitation" to the Court to displace their choices,
although he finds the implications so "frightening" that he counsels against
employing such "untethered discretion" unless "limiting" principles can be
developed.214 The activists, in a word, are in disarray, seeking various
rationalizations of the undoubted judicial take-over of self-government
from the people. 215 Of such activist soul-searching Fisher makes "no
mention." Yet, these are the central issues, not my shortcomings as a
polemicist. Indeed, Fisher allows that "Berger deserves great credit; he
draws attention to subjects of great moment, he challenges prevailing
authorities, and he sparks a livelier debate than would exist without his
prodding., 21 6 That is no mean achievement.
But his only limitation on the "surrogate" power is that the Justices should "accept the Founders'
political philosophy," LuSKY, supra note 211, at 21, calling for soothsaying of a very high order.
214. See Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 404,
411,415,425,448 (1978). See Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation,"54 IND.
L. J. 277 (1978).
215. The need for such rationalization was stressed by Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). Perry, supra note 7, at 697, reemphasizes the need "to
develop a political-constitutional theory in defense of constitutional policymaking by the Supreme
Court."
216. Fisher, supra note 1, at 174; see also note 7 supra.
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